The paper begins by focusing the basic idea that Gestalt phenomena belong not only to the realm of perception but to the realm of inference. It is shown that Gestalt effects (i.e. the derivability of incompatible indifferent conclusions on the basis of the same background information) often occur both in counterfactual and in ampliative -i.e. inductive and abductive -reasoning. The main thesis of the paper is that the common feature of such forms of non-deductive reasoning is provided by a rational selection between incompatible conclusions, where rationality lies in the choice of the alternative which preserves the maximum of background information. It is also stressed a distinction between a weak and a strong notion of incompatibility. Such distinction may help in giving account of some alleged Gestalt phenomena which have been recognized in theory construction and theory change.
1
The term Gestalt is no more part of the specialistic jargon. In a well-known dictionary we find it defined as follows: "a perceptual pattern or structure possessing qualities as a whole that cannot be described merely as a sum of its parts 1 ." According to an important school of psychological thought, any non-atomic object of perception shows a recognizable structure which cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts, so it has essentially a Gestalt character.
2
What we will call here Gestalt Effect is a special case of a Gestalt phenomenon. We speak of a Gestalt effect when the same set of informational elements yields at least two recognizable patterns a and b which are (i) incompatible (ii) indifferent, in the sense that we have no reasons to select a or b as a dominant object of perception The incompatibility of the perceived configurations deserves a detailed comment since this notion may be a source of equivocation. In the first place, we may say that two configurations are incompatible inasmuch as they cannot be perceived together by the same agent. This aspect of the Gestalt phenomena is at the origin of the so-called "Gestalt switch" and is a typical feature of the Gestalt experience. We cannot "see" at the same time a glass of wine as half-full and also as half-empty, or a zebra as a black animal with white stripes and also as a white animal with black stripes. We will 1 
Collins English Dictionary, Harper Collins Publishers, Glasgow 1979
2 The literature about the so-called Gestaltpsychologie is immense. For a basic reference see [6] .
call this kind of incompatibility incompatibility-1. But there is a more radical kind of incompatibility which does not concern our ability to perceive jointly two different images, but the qualities of the perceived object itself. In the latter sense, which we shall call incompatibility-2, two objects of perception are incompatible-2 when their descriptions exclude each other in some sense of this term. Incompatibility-2 yields Gestalt effects in proper sense, while incompatibility-1 yields what we shall call Gestalt effects in weak sense. Such well-known figures as the Necker cube, the antelopebird and the Wittgenstein/Kuhnian duck-rabbit originate cases of incompatibility-2. It is not straightforward to define the sense in which the relevant descriptions are incompatible-2. In the cases of images of independently known objects, as for instance the duck-rabbit, it seems that we need some presupposed knowledge of the meaning of the terms involved in the description. For instance we have to make explicit a meaning postulate concerning the notion of a correct image:
1-If a and b are different objects, and x is the correct image of b, x cannot be the correct image of a.
Thanks to this postulate we cannot say that a duck-rabbit is a correct image of a duck and also of a rabbit, since this is in conflict with the grammar of the word "correct" as applied to images. (This of course opens the possibility that a duck-rabbit is an image of something, but not a correct image of it). The origin of a Gestalt effect in visual perception lies in the fact that different proper subsets of the same set of points yield, so to speak, different images, so that the complex figure containing such subsets turns out to be ambiguous. The Necker's cube for instance may be seen as the composition of two different ordered set of points which singularly do not yield ambiguous images (see the marked lines of Figure 1) . Gestalt phenomena may be found not only in the field of visual perception. Many games of words or puns belong to the same category: "What is mind? No matter " has two different senses which are incompatible-1 but their conjunction verbally expressed is not strictly speaking a contradiction.
We will assume that every perceptual evidence may in principle be verbalized, namely that Gestalt phenomena have a cognitive meaning inasmuch as they are describable in some natural language. This assumption allows to speak of incompatibility-2, which depends on comparing descriptions, but may create a problem in some kinds of Gestalt phenomena, for instance in the field of music: here we find that the same sequence of notes may be harmonized in different ways, even if their possible incompatibility may be difficult to describe linguistically.
The relation between the set of atomic points and the perceived Gestalt (what is "expressed" by them) is parallel to the one between a set of atomic statements which transmits basic information, and some (ampliative or not ampliative) conclusion we draw from them. So we expect to have Gestalt phenomena and Gestalt effects also in the field of reasoning. This is the subject of the present paper.
2
What we called incompatibility-2 in §1 is a matter of degree. It may happen that two or more incompatible-2 Gestalt may be derived by the same stock of information, but one of them is dominant over the others, which are not immediately perceived since they are less natural for the perceiver. Gestalt effects arise when there is a parity between them, or, as it is sometimes said even by logicians, a tie between them.
Adding or deleting information clearly may cancel, or introduce, a Gestalt effect both in visual and inferential phenomena. Let us call CR (Corpus Rationale) the set of all true atomic sentences and laws closed under logical consequence. As a matter of fact, we always work with a subset K of CR which is closed under logical consequence of standard logic, so that presupposing total evidence is the special case in which K=CR.
The realm of counterfactual reasoning may be considered a preferential field for the analysis of Gestalt effects. What is sometimes unclear is that in counterfactual reasoning we are always faced with the problem of choosing between alternative conclusions which are, in a sense to be clarified, exclusive:
Let K for instance be the set of the following statements 1,2,3:
1. All the pieces of butter melt when are heated in normal conditions (L) 2. The piece of butter a did not melt 3. The piece of butter a was not heated
Counterfactual supposition:
4. The piece of butter a was heated in normal conditions.
The set K ∪ {4} is obviously inconsistent, so by standard logic every conclusion should follow. 4 . is in conflict with 3., so in order to obtain a consistent set of premises K ∪ {4} may be reduced to {1, 2, 4} which is still inconsistent. What we can do is to draw a conclusion by some of its consistent subsets. Since 4. is the supposition, we have then to treat with {1, 4} and {2, 4}.
The counterfactual conclusions which follow from such two subsets include the following two:
5+. The piece of butter a was melted (derived by 1., i.e. L, and 4.) 5-. The piece of butter a was the instance of a piece of butter which does not melt when is heated in normal conditions (derived by 2. and 4.).
The two conclusions are both logically sound, so the two related counterfactuals should also be considered both sound 3 . We remark that the clause "in normal condi-tions" embodied in law L makes it a "normic law" 4 , so that the conclusion does not follow in a probabilistic way (in section 4 we will use a different approach).
The striking fact about 5+ and 5-, however, is that they have incompatible consequents on the ground of the same antecedent. In this example 5-implies the piece of butter a was not heated, which is the negation of 5+ . Semantically speaking, there is no accessible possible world in which 4, 5-and 5+ are jointly true, so that the counterfactual (C) If the piece of butter a had been heated, it would have melted and it would have been an instance of a piece of butter which in normal conditions is heated but does not melt is clearly absurd. However, only one of the two incompatible conclusions in 5+ and 5-may be considered sound and also "natural", i.e. 5+. The reason why 5-is felt as unnatural is that it implies the falsity of the law L, while 5+ implies the falsity of the atomic sentence 2. So they are derived from two different subsets of K, one containing L and the other containing 2.
5 , which have a different epistemic value. One of them contains a law, which has a high information content, while the other does not contain a law and has a lower information content. This is the reason why we "instinctively" choose the former and not the latter. In the choice we apply the principle of saving the maximum of background information, and unconsciously apply Quine's "maxim of minimal mutilation" 6 . A different way of looking at the same example is to say that while the conjunction of 5+) and 5-) cannot be chosen since it is inconsistent, their disjunction is an appropriate, even if uninteresting, consequent: 5v) Either the piece of butter a melted or was the instance of a piece of butter which does not melt when heated in normal conditions. The pervasiveness of counterfactual inference suggests that it is not an anomalous kind of inference, as it was considered in the Fifties, but a paradigmatic case of inference guided by rational criteria. The key idea of rational inference may be sketched as the idea of selecting among incompatible conclusions, drawn by standard logic from a premise A and a consistent stock of background statements K, the one which is the most information-preserving with respect to the information contained in K. If such conclusions are C 1 ..C n , their disjunction C 1 ∨...∨ C n is also a conclusion derived from A and K. Alternatively, then, rational inference may be considered as the elimination of a disjunctive conclusion by selecting the most information-preserving disjunct which follows from the given antecedent 7 . Note that eliminating a disjunct from a disjunction of incompatible disjuncts means in normal cases to increase determination (as for instance passing from "sexuated" 4 For this notion see [14] to "male"), i.e. passing from something generic to something specific. So the rule of choosing the most information-preserving disjunct may be formulated as a method to pass from a less determined conclusion to a more determinate conclusion 8 . When do we meet a Gestalt effect in counterfactual reasoning? Such a situation arises when we are in front a of a tie, i.e. there is no reason to choose a conclusion among two incompatible conclusions or, in other words, to eliminate a disjunction which is a consequence of the statements in K. The famous Bizet-Verdi case is a well-known example.
Let K be the set But since the third disjunct is necessarily false 7. boils down to the simpler disjunction
Either Bizet was Italian or Verdi was French
Here we are unable to eliminate the disjunction since we lack the possibility of selecting something which we may qualify as the most information-preserving conclusion.
As already mentioned, the extension of K with additional information may change the Gestalt image, both in the visual and inferential case. Suppose we come to know from Verdi's letters that he disliked France and very often in his life refused the possibility of becoming a French citizen, while other important documents say that Bizet before dying was performing all the necessary steps to become an Italian citizen, so a compatriot of Verdi. In front of such a stock of information K ′ which is an extension of K there is some reason to conclude from K Here we are still in front of a Gestalt phenomenon but not of a Gestalt effect, since the conclusion is informationally dominant over "Verdi would have been French". 8 The idea that counterfactual reasoning rests on a choice between conclusion is not new. See for instance [13] , where however a different criterion of selection is proposed.
9 Also deleting information from K may of course modify the result. But the operation of removal of elements from a database has a number of logical difficulties: see [2] . The removal of an element E is obtained by extending K by some B which implies the falsity of E , so it depends on a special kind of extension.
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It is often said that ambiguity is a typical feature of counterfactual hypotheses and this is the mark of the anomaly of counterfactual reasoning 10 . Let us take now into consideration conditionals which are not contrary-to fact. Let us call factual conditional a conditional with a true antecedent, and afactual conditional a conditional with an antecedent of unknown truth value. Many factual conditionals whose conclusion is ampliative and drawn from known facts stated in the antecedent are based on some inductive argument. Since inductive conclusions in every day life are frequently drawn by some psychological automatism as the one described by Hume, it is natural to receive the impression that in inductive argument we are never faced with a choice between incompatible conclusions.
From a logical viewpoint things are however different, as shown by Goodman's paradox. The great merit of Goodman's analysis is to have shown that inductive reasoning always involves a choice among exclusive legitimate conclusions, even when the sample containing evidence is wide, homogeneous and not biased. From the premise that all emeralds are green if observed up to now we may conclude that after 3000 they will be green, but also that they will be grue (green if examined before 3000 or blue if examined after 3000), which implies that they will be blue after 3000. The conclusions which are derived are then incompatible, even if every one of them is derived via a sound argument. The ambiguity of conclusions is not clearly a Gestalt effect since one of the conclusions (just as in standard counterfactual reasoning) is dominant, but gives anyway rise to a Gestalt phenomenon in the mentioned sense.
We have to consider that Goodman's argument applies not only to the inference from past events to future events but to every projective inference from a sample of known cases to unknown cases. Suitable Goodmanian predicates may always be built: for instance the predicate Greenob may be the predicate "green if belonging to the class of observed cases or not-green if belonging to class of the unobserved cases".
Many solutions, as is well known, have been proposed to Goodman's riddle, some of which ask for restrictions on predicate formation.
11 . But let us stick to unrestricted first order logic: it is clear that only one of the two conclusions is "natural " and it is also clear why we "naturally" choose the alternative "green" (to remain in the example). Let us observe that a commonly tacitly assumed premise of inductive arguments is not a law but a meta-law, i.e. the so-called principle of Uniformity of Nature (UN) 12 . Any appropriate extension of every set of atomic informative statement K should then include UN. To choose the alternative "emeralds will be blue after 2000 " means to make a choice which is incompatible with UN since it implies that emeralds are going sooner or later to change their color. To make this choice implies the rejection of UN as a principle of reasoning entailing the invariance of the non-accidental 10 See [13] 11 A solution defended by the present author is to avoid forming such "non-natural" predicates as bleen, grue (also:not-raven, not-black) by putting suitable restrictions over the kind of predicates used in induction: following the line originally proposed by William E. Johnson (1921) we should use in projective arguments not arbitrary predicates but predicates which are determinated under some determinable. "Blue" and "green" are determined of "colored", while "grue" and "bleen" are not determinate under any known or unknown common determinable, since they do not satisfy the minimal conditions required for such a quality. See [8] 12 The theory of induction which is assumed for the aim of the present context is the so-called "Presupposition properties of substances, and this leads to an immense loss of information about the structure of the world .
What about Gestalt effects in inductive reasoning? Differently from the gruebleen case, many cases of inductive arguments ask for a choice among incompatible conclusions which are indifferent. Suppose for instance we have at our disposal the following set K of information:
1. Airplane a has the motors built by the old firm X and belongs to the old air company Y 2. The air company Y never suffered accidents 3. The motors built by firm X suffered various accidents. Let us now add a factual premise which is consistent with 1,2,3: for instance 4. j is the number which is assigned to the next flight of airplane a. We may conclude with two incompatible conclusions: 5+. Flight number j is highly safe 5-. Flight number j is not highly safe.
and obviously with the disjunction "5+ or 5-". But we cannot eliminate the disjunction since 5+ and 5-are derived from two different subsets of K with respect to which they appear to be a) equally informationpreserving b) jointly incompatible. In this case the principle of Uniformity of Nature is unable to solve the puzzle.
What we can do to eliminate the undesired Gestalt effect is to increase background information in order to gain elements for a choice. As we saw in §1, this strategy works in the resolution of counterfactual ties and is usefully applied to inductive arguments. For instance, it may happen that in acquiring new information we learn that the company Y follows the policy of buying only motors which receive special supplementary tests. So the motors of airplane a up to now respected the safety standard, and we have no reason to expect that they will be at risk in the future. Now we have to note that in the Bizet-Verdi example the two incompatible conclusions were deductively derived, so to give the wrong impression that counterfactual reasoning is a branch of deductive reasoning 13 . Unfortunately things are different. In many cases the laws which are involved in counterfactuals are inductively established and have a probabilistic character: their form is in the most simple case Pr(B/A) =r , where r is a high probability value 14 , so as a matter of fact two or more orders of choices are involved in their use. As a result, Gestalt effects involving inductive generalizations are not difficult to be found.
An alleged instance is as follows. Among the background information in K we have all true lawlike generalizations and also what follows: 0. I did not write La donnaè mobile 1. I hate "La donnaè mobile" 2. Verdi wrote "La donnaè mobile". 13 As already remarked, if the factual information is expressed by such statements as "in normal conditions A" and the involved law are normic laws, the argument is not strictly speaking probabilistic.
14 We are assuming that value of r is theory-dependent. In other words different theories may tacitly or explicitly fix different threshold-value which governs the reliability of the conclusions.
Then one could assert the two conditionals: 3+. If I had been Verdi, I would have written "La donnaè mobile" 3-. If I had been Verdi, I would not have written "La donnaè mobile" which jointly yields a Gestalt effects since the two conclusions are derived with high probability, they are exclusive and indifferent. The involved lawlike generalizations are of course different. 3-is derived by a generalization which roughly is 4
• ."If x writes a piece of music, x usually does not hate it" or the contrapositive 4
•• ."If x hates a piece of music,x does not write it" while 3+ is derived in a more straight way. This however, one could observe, makes the Gestalt effect dubious, since the consequent of 3-conflicts with 2., while 1. jointly with the consequent of 3+ conflicts with 0. and with the more informative 4
•• . Another more famous example is due to Quine Here the role of induction is double. The first, as already remarked, lies in the probabilistic character of the involved laws. But another one is in establishing that the consequents are indeed incompatible. We cannot speak of a Gestalt effect unless we prove, not only believe, that the conclusions are incompatible.
What is clear in fact is that the two consequents are not incompatible in the logical sense of the term. We surely know inductively that no one in history used or ever will use simultaneously the catapults and the atomic bombs, but it is not difficult to imagine a situation -say, a dream or a comic film -in which this anomalous combination occurs. This imagined possible world is surely not in the realm of "probable" possible worlds, which leaves a door open to giving some sense to such an astonishing counterfactual as ( • ) If Caesar were now in command, he would use both the atom bomb and the catapults where the consequent is not strictly speaking contradictory. May we speak again of a Gestalt effect in this case? However that may be, in this case incompatibility is not a matter of opinion. But there are also other cases in which we have to do with a believed but not actual incompatibility. It may happen that there is some error of evaluation of the compatibility and incompatibility of the construction. It may happen, for instance, that after careful investigation we discover that Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde are the same person, so it may happen that certain apparently incompatible conclusions are actually compatible or indeed equivalent. No doubt, when two different persons describe a glass of wine as half full or half empty the "sense" of the two phrases are incompatible: nevertheless the statements which are used in the description are logically equivalent to saying that fifty per cent of the inner part of the cup is occupied by wine and the other fifty per cent is occupied by air. This "exit strategy" which reduces apparent Gestalt effects to Gestalt effects in weak sense will receive attention in the next section. In logical terms, it amounts to eliminating a disjunction A v B by simply using the supplementary information that A=B.
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In front of what we have said up to now we have to go back to the famous Peircean tripartition between deduction, induction and abduction. We have seen that inferential Gestalt effects may be yielded by inductive and deductive tools. What can we say about abduction? To begin with, we may define abduction as a kind of argument which leads to the best explanation of a given explanandum E.
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This definition presupposes that the conclusion is drawn by selecting a winning hypothesis (possibly in wait of a counterproof) inside a set of incompatible hypotheses which are supposed to exhaust the explanatory possibilities. An alternative characterization lies in saying that we select an explanatory hypothesis by eliminating all the disjuncts with the exception of one inside a disjunction of incompatible explanatory hypotheses. The analogy with counterfactual and inductive reasoning is obvious; however we have to remark: 1) that the set of explanatory hypotheses h 1 ...h n among which an eliminative selection is performed depends on the meaning of a true statement E (the explanandum), which they are supposed to explain. 2) It may happen that the elimination of one of them implies other hypotheses, so that it may happen that the elimination of one hypothesis leads to a new set of explanatory hypotheses.
3) In order to be part of the explanans of E, each hypothesis h i implies along with suitable elements of the explanans E, but not vice versa.
As is well known, Sherlock Holmes theorized in various points of Conan Doyle's novels the eliminative procedure as the key of abductive argumentation by using such slogans as "if we eliminate every hypothesis except one, the remaining one must be the truth". But Holmes is not only a follower of the Bacon-Mill eliminative induction. In some of his methodological reflections, in fact, we find some illuminating point in which the Gestalt character of the so-called evidence is in some way suggested. For instance we read: "Circumstantial evidence is a very tricky thing" answered Holmes thoughtfully. It may seem to point very straight to one thing, but if you shift your own point of view a little, you may find it pointing in an equally uncompromising manner to something entirely different" (The Boscombe Valley Mystery).
Suppose for instance we have to explain why Smith was killed by a poison. Suppose that after many investigations we are left with two possibilities whose disjunction is highly probable with respect to the explanandum: Tim alone put the poison (h 1 ) or Tom alone put the poison (h 2 ). The situation may be described in this way: the explanandum E conjoined with other background information in K makes highly probable the disjunctions of some exclusive hypotheses belonging to a certain set H. Now everybody easily images a situation in which a subset K1 of K suggests with high probability that Tim alone "in those circumstances" put the poison, while another subset K2 of K implies with high probability "in those circumstances" the conclusion that Tom alone put the poison. If the conclusions are exclusive and 16 This is sometimes called "Harmanian" abduction as opposed to "creative " abduction . See for instance Sami Paavola, Essential Tension in Scientific Discovery, WEB page.
17 As is well known, Peirce characterizes abductive inference in the following way: 1. A surprising fact E is observed. 2: E would be explanable in a natural way if I were true 2.There is some reason to think that I is true.
equally plausible, we might qualify this not only as a Gestalt phenomenon but as a Gestalt effect in the proper sense, grasping the kernel of what Holmes expressed in his methodological reflections. In the case of the example what we are able to conclude is only a disjunction which cannot be simplified since we have no reason to select a preferential disjunct. As already remarked with respect to counterfactual and inductive reasoning, new information may cancel the Gestalt effect. In the case of our example it may happen that new information leads to deletion of one disjuncts, but it may also happen something different, i.e. that new evidence simply changes the set of hypotheses. It may be, for instance, that from new investigations it turns out that a third person (Jim) had the key of the room of the victim, so he also had the possibility to perform the crime. So a new hypothesis h 3 (Jim put the poison) is to be taken in consideration. It may also be that one of the two original suppositions is deleted by the new discovery, but it may also happen that the old set of hypotheses {h 1 , h 2 } is replaced by richest set {h 1 , h 2 , h 3 }.
It is important to remark that there is a difference in the quality of the hypotheses which may be the conclusion of an abductive argument. As we know, the explanans in Hempel-Oppenheim's sense includes facts and laws. The scientifically most interesting form of abduction (which should be better called retroduction, following Hanson) is the selection not of the best "fact" but of the best "laws" explaining the explanandum. The case of Kepler's retroduction narrated by Hanson in "Patterns of Discovery" is a wonderful example.
In Hanson's view -anticipated by L.Wittgentsein and M.Polany -theories work as tools to recognize Gestalt (which means "to see as" or "to have theory-laden perceptions"). Since theories in this conception are incommensurable, the Gestalt perceptions they grant are incompatible in the sense which here we called incompatible-1 and in many cases also incompatible-2. Where Tycho sees the Sun as a static body, Kepler sees a moving Sun even if, in a sense, their visual experience is the same.
When Kepler took into consideration various conjectural laws to explain the motion of the planets, some of the conjectures were incompatible in the first sense, other in the second. The Ptolemaic hypothesis of the circle and the one of the ovoides were eliminated as being in conflict with the observed data. In the conclusive phase of his terrible effort of inquiry Kepler entertained two hypotheses which formed, from his viewpoint, a Gestalt effect (libration and ellipsis). His error was however to think that they were incompatible. As a matter of fact, it turned out not only that they are compatible but that they are equivalent. So he had the same kind of surprise of the detective who discovers that Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde are the same person. Here Hanson commented: "The difference between "libration or ellipsis" and "libration=ellipsis" is the same difference between bird and antelope before and after its identification".
18 This latter remark from our viewpoint is incorrect, since , as already remarked, the same set of points cannot be a correct image of an antelope and also of a bird. The example of the zebra, which is also used in another context by Hanson himself, 19 would have been more suitable. In Kepler's case the disjunction was eliminated simply because the two disjuncts which were wrongly assumed to be 18 Cap iv,p.102 of the Italian translation.
19 "What is the difference between us when you see the zebra as black with white stripes and I see it as white with black stripes? Nothing optical. Yet there might be a context (for instance, in the genetics of animal pigmentation), where such a difference could be important". distinct, were actually equivalent, so what Kepler believed to be a Gestalt effect was simply a Gestalt effect in weak sense.
So it may happen that a difficulty in treating with a presumed Gestalt effect is to establish whether the alternatives are really incompatible. One could say, for instance, that the explanation of many quantum phenomena yield a Gestalt effect inasmuch the wave-model explains a part of the explanandum, while the particle-model explains another part. Here what may be wrong is the claim of incompatibility. No one really proved that the two models are incompatible, and it is not uncommon today to hold that there is no contradiction in speaking of wave-cles.
In the last years much insights has been developed concerning so-called "visual abduction" 20 . As is well known, Peirce was the first to see that there is an abductive element in perception, i.e. in classifying something as, say, wool rather than silk. By using a subjunctive conditional for instance I could say: "If this tissue were wool, I would have the same sensory impressions I actually have. So this tissue is wool."
May the visual Gestalt phenomena be reconstructed by an analogous formulation? In observing a duck-rabbit I could say in different times (˚)"If this set of points were the correct image of a duck, I would have the sensations I now have. So this set of points is the correct image of a duck" (˚˚)"If this set of points were the correct image of a rabbit, I would have the sensations I now have. So this set of points is the correct image of a rabbit"
The two explanantia are incompatible. In comparison with the Bizet-Verdi case, we here notice that the incompatibility is located in the antecedents, not in the consequents. Such sketchy remarks suggest that a better understanding of visual Gestalt phenomena might be performed by studying Gestalt phenomena in rational inference.
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A logical relation between counterfactual conditionals and ampliative conditionals had been observed by Nelson Goodman in his seminal post-war essay on counterfactual.
With reference to such a counterfactual as (♯) If that piece of butter had been heated at 150
• , it would have melted Goodman makes this comment [3, p. 147] "The problem of counterfactuals is equally a problem of factual conditionals, for any counterfactual can be transposed into a conditional with a true antecedent and a true consequent, for example (♯♯) Since that butter did not melt, it was not heated at 150
• F".
Goodman's claim may appear unconvincing in the light of contemporary conditional logic. In fact, it suggests that the relation of conditionality has universally the property of contraposition, which along with transitivity and weakening is considered to be not universally valid for counterfactual conditionals. Furthermore Goodman deals with negative events, which are seldom part of explanatory contexts. A more telling example would perhaps be the following. Let us suppose that it is known that the piece of butter was heated at 150
• F and melted. Then one may say with truth:
( §) If that piece of butter had not been heated at 150
• F, it would not have melted which according to Goodman should be equivalent to ( § §) Since that piece of butter melted, it was heated at at 150
• F. Now the equivalence between § and § § may work in contexts in which the clauses of § are known to be false. But what if we suppress the information that the piece of butter has been heated, or better if we know nothing about the history of that piece of butter except that it melted in the given circumstances?. In such a case the conclusion of § § may be accepted only if it is the best explanation in a set of possible alternative explanations which are excluded, as for instance "the piece of butter was exposed to sun for two hours" o "that piece butter was a defective piece of butter".
Using an "as if" construction , the conditional equivalent to ( §) would not be the counterfactual ( § §) but the "fictional" conditional ( § § §) That piece of butter melted, as if it had been heated at 150
• F.
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We conclude that beyond the structural analogies between counterfactual, inductive and abductive reasoning which have been focused in the preceding sections there is a net of unequivocal logical relations between various form of conditionals expressing contextually different applications of the considered schema of argument.
We have then at our disposal sufficient elements to work out a general theory of rational inference in which counterfactual, inductive and abductive conditionals may be treated as special cases of what we could call a rational conditional. Modal logic and probability theory are suitable tools to provide the linguistic and semantic framework for such a theory.
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Using rigorous formal tools to define truth conditions for the rational conditionals might be useful to explore at least some directions of inquiry which has been usually neglected in the literature about conditionals and in particular:
1. To establish a relation between rational inference and some kinds of inference which have been sometimes called "reasonable" by various author (for instance H. Reichenbach and R.Stalnaker). Incidentally, this reflection could be useful to enlighten the opposition between rationality and reasonableness which have been sometimes stressed by philosophers.
2. To define exactly the truth conditions for conditionals with iterated antecedent, which seem to be essential to represent causal or explanatory overdetermination.
3. To give a rigorous sense to the notion of relevance or consequentiality between antecedents and consequents of a conditional, which means to go beyond the limits of so-called classical conditional logic.
